Greenhill books and David Markham have hit a home run with this magnificent collection of the Bulletins of Napoleon's Grande Armee. This is the first time they have been collected together and published in English. This book is a wonderful reference work, and if definitely fills in a very large blank in the history of the period.

There are some who would doubt the usefulness of the Bulletins as historical reference. It is true that they were used as propaganda, but it is also true that they were full of accurate information as well as some misinformation, deliberately put in them by the Emperor. There are two things that must be remembered when talking of Napoleon's Bulletins. First, they were never intended as history; second, Napoleon was the first European ruler to speak directly to his people, and the Bulletins was one of the ways in which he did it.

An interesting facet of this volume is that it contains more than just the published Bulletins. There is other relevant correspondence of the period, one of the most interesting is the death warrant issued against Austrian General Chasteler by Napoleon for his conduct regarding French and Bavarian prisoners during the Tyrol uprising in 1809. Apparently, he allowed prisoners taken by troops under his command to be murdered, and did nothing about it. There was a price on his head, but unfortunately he got away. This is but one of the valuable gems that you will find in the pages of this most excellent of volumes.

This book is highly recommended and it should be on the bookshelf of every enthusiast of the period. Much useful information and knowledge can be gleaned from these pages, and the author has definitely made his mark with this volume.

J. David Markham has compiled the first English language translation of all of the bulletins of the Grande Armée from 1805 to 1814. In addition, he has included reports from marshals and the major general of the army, Marshal Alexander Berthier. Markham has written an excellent introduction that he calls "A modern view of Napoleon's bulletins" in which he points out the strengths and weaknesses in the use of these documents. The book also contains the bulletins of Marshal Masséna's Army of Italy in 1805; a selected guide to men and their titles; a partial list of other important individuals mentioned in the bulletins; and a very good index, all of which make it very user-friendly for scholars doing research on Napoleon, his generals, and/or the Napoleonic wars.

These bulletins also provide a real insight into Napoleonic propaganda. They were written for publication in the Monitor, the official government newspaper, to bolster moral and support on the home front and to raise the moral of the troops on campaigns. Thus, when he deemed it wise or necessary, the Emperor was given to exaggerate his successes and accomplishments and those of his armies while playing down his reversals and setbacks.

Nevertheless, the bulletins provide a wealth of information on Napoleon, his armies, and men who fought those wars. Markham has provided a major contribution to Napoleonic studies by making the bulletins available in the English language in one concise volume. It will be a welcomed addition to individual libraries and a must for colleges and universities where French history is taught.

John G. Gallaher
Professor Emeritus of History
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville
Author, The Iron Marshal: A Biography of Louis N. Davout; Napoleon's Irish Legion; General Alexandre Dumas: Soldier of the French Revolution.

Occasionally a new book is released that is so important to the study of the Napoleonic era that it immediately falls into the "must have" category for both Napoleonic scholars and enthusiasts. Imperial Glory is such a book. David Markham has assembled for the first time, all of the bulletins written by Napoleon between 1805 and 1812. Many of them have never been translated into English before, while others were only available to the serious scholar. Additionally, Mr. Markham also checked the translations of those bulletins that had been translated in the 19th Century and found many errors in them.

Napoleon used his bulletins for a variety of reasons: to inform the public and his soldiers of the progress of his campaigns, to praise his soldiers and their officers for the actions, and to ensure his enemies heard of his triumphs. They were published in the government's official newspaper, Le Moniteur, and often hung on doors and posted in public squares throughout the Empire. The veracity of the bulletins has always been open to question, with one of the most frequently used expressions from the Napoleonic era being, "To lie like a bulletin."

Although many of these bulletins were published for propaganda purposes, Mr. Markham does point out most are "reasonably accurate." Furthermore, he writes "[Napoleon's] losses were sometimes described as 'considerable', and he would list specific officers that were lost, along with the numbers of men killed, wounded or taken prisoners."

In addition to all 183 bulletins written from 1805 and 1812, Imperial Glory contains 170 other documents, many of which have never been published in English before. Broken down by year, the book includes:

1805

37 Bulletins of the Grande Armée (complete)
9 Bulletins of Masséna's Army of Italy (complete)
9 Proclamations
3 Decrees
2 Orders of the Day
3 Letters
1 Armistice
1 Treaty of Peace

1806-1807

87 Bulletins (complete)
4 Proclamations
1 Letter
1 Armistice between France and Prussia
1 Armistice between France and Russia
1 Treaty between France and Prussia
1 Treaty between France and Russia

1809

30 Bulletins (complete)
4 Proclamations
2 Proclamations of the King of Saxony
2 Orders of the Day
2 Reports by the Viceroy (Eugène)
3 Letters
1 Treaty between France and Austria

1812

29 Bulletins (Complete)
1 Final dispatch from Paris
1 Order of the Day
1 Letter
21 Field Reports, including:
5 Reports from Marshal Ney
4 Reports from Marshal Murat
2 Reports from Marshal Davout
2 Reports from Eugène
2 Reports from Marshal St Cyr
1 Report of Marshal Macdonald
1 Report from Marshal Oudinot
1 Report from Prince Poniatowski
1 Report from Prince Schwarzenberg
1 Report of Russian General Wittgenstein to Tsar Alexander
1 Report from General Wrede

1813

51 Reports from Le Moniteur, which often include reports from multiple days
2 Proclamations
2 Reports from Marshal Berthier
1 Report from General Vandamme
1 Report from Marshal Ney
1 Report from General Milhaud
6 Letters
1 Armistice

1814

23 Reports from Le Moniteur, including two "bulletins" at the end of the campaign
2 Proclamations
1 Decree
1 Order of the Day
2 Speeches
1 Act of Abdication

The collection of material is by campaign, with a separate chapter covering the different campaigns fought in that year or years. Within each chapter, the material is also arranged chronologically. This is an ideal arrangement, for not only does it permit the reader to follow the campaigns as seen through the official press releases, but it also provides great insight into how Napoleon managed his propaganda campaign.

The supplementary material is fascinating. I found particularly interesting the after-action reports on various battles written by the unit commander to the Imperial Headquarters. These reports were not written for public consumption and often were the first communication between a subordinate commander and the army headquarters. These reports contain information that would not necessarily be placed in the bulletins. Mr. Markham also included all the bulletins written by Marshal Masséna in 1805. He was in command of the Army of Italy and operating as an independent commander. Masséna's bulletins are in chronological order and interspersed with Napoleon's. Reading them together will give the reader a good feel for the two individuals' writing styles.

Mr. Markham and Greenhill Books are to be commended for making available to the public, material that has long been inaccessible to all but those with extensive libraries. Imperial Glory is an impressive collection of documents that every Napoleonic library should own. Do not delay buying Imperial Glory. It will be snatched up quickly and soon will be out of print.

As the Louvre is just so darn big, you need this book if for no other reason than to whittle down the museum to what interests you. New York City's Met. is big, but frankly, the whole Met. would be one half of one floor, of one wing, in the Louvre. Most Knopf guides are very detailed and thoughtfully written and this is no exception. Indispensible for your visit(s) to the Louvre.

I received this book as a gift when I left to study abroad in Paris a few years ago. I went to Paris to study art and I found this book to be an excellent guide to this fantastic museum. It is so interesting and informative. And when you are done visiting the Louvre, you have an excellent souvenir!

A treasure trove of images and information making it almost redundant to go to the Louvre itself. Too bad there are not guides like this for the Musee D'Orsay and other museums of Paris. It seems that the guide should have been expanded to include the other museums since the Knopf city guide book gives the others so little space.

On my first trip to Italy, I spent 8 nights in Venice with this book and was not disappointed with any aspect of the descriptions, histories, and cultural commentary of the book, however, this was my first time booking a 'recommended' hotel and got burned bad. This is why in all the Knopf books I have reviewed, I consistently state that unless you are talking about a world class place, like the Cipriani, you must use another resource to get your hotel and restaraunt picks. While I love the Knopf guidebooks for Cities, Venice is a little 'tough'; compared to Rome, Paris, London, Dublin, or Munich and New York (Cities I have been to or live in). Therefore I offer the following caveat to the traveler beyond recommending this book unconditionally. Venice is tough, and really is a theme park. What I mean by this is the following: Venice lost half its native population from like 1920 to 1980. It then lost half of what remained of its native population from 1980 to 2000. Venice, (the main islands), has no industry, employees, or even citizens left not completely relegated to tourism. And the tourists do come. There were so many Americans in Venice that it felt like a mall on Long Island. The result is that every Venetian you meet is, shall we say, a little edgy having to deal with hoardes of foreigners from 7 am till 2 am, 7 days a week! I saw more locals being abused by tourists in Venice than anywhere else, so the locals get back at you with scams, charging for every little thing, and otherwise looking to shave am extra buck off of you at every turn. Most of the time I do not mind this, because frankly you couldn't pay me enough to do their jobs, but the only time I have every really been fleeced was in Venice. No Cote D'Azure, or Miami, or New York, clip joint could compare to Venice

The Knopf guide really does not go into this, and I guess it really can not, but watch for the following and frankly, I dont mind paying, believe me, but I balked at a lot of the following:

1) Paying for every church you go into. Paying within the church to stand on the balcony, and then pay again to go into the crypt. Paying to light up every painting in the church you might be interested in looking at.
2) Paying every time you check your coat, and then charging you extra to hang an umbrella. The Venice casino was a JOKE for doing this.
3) Any gondolier by himself looking to give rides is double, if not triple charging.
4) Hotels will claim to be air conditioned, then charge you per night. If you dont buy the a/c they will fill your room with skeeters by leaving the windows wide open through dusk when you are outside eating.
5) The Jumping off point into the City from the mainland has 500 scams. Do not let your rental agent hire you a water taxi cause you will be charged way over. Any boat, car hire, porter, that is away from the main action is scamming.

I have always found that going into a small out of the way place with locals is part of the fun of being away, but Venetians do not want to socialize with you, the tourist, for the most part, while you are on the main islands. You can go out to the Lido for the day, or stay in a beach hotel there, and everyone is their good old normal self again. But do stay in Venice for a few nights, because despite all this, Venice is unique in the world, and you will feel like Othello when you walk around at night, or early in the morning you see a cat sleeping in an old well.

To avoid a lot of this, stick to Rick Steves. I think Rick is great in general, but his Italy books are indispensible. I wish to God I had it in Venice. But I have no regrets, because I felt something unique there. For a fleeting glance, like taking a gondola at night with a full moon, when, in the back of some palaces you see the old water entrance and egress, you see in the light, or how the shadows look, and you hear no cars, you see something identicle to the way it was 800 years ago. In most of Europe you cant do that. In Venice you can!

The Knopf Guide Venice provides a colorful picture-packed in-depth guide to Venice and the surrounding attractions of the Venice Lagoon. Like all the Knopf guides there is an extensive introduction giving the historical background to Venice. The individual tourist attractions are described in great detail with copious illustration. I wish more photographs were used rather than drawings. This minor fault is common to all the Knopf guides. There are good sections describing Murano, Burano, Lido and San Michele (the Cemetery Island) as well as the obligatory tourist attractions.

A visit to Venice is a jarring experience; Venice being like no other place on earth. The real 18th century (and older) architecture seems almost fake, you have to pinch yourself to be reminded that it's not a new Disney ride: "Pirates of the Adriatic." The Knopf guide prepares you for all this if you have the foresight to read it in advance, before taking your trip. There is too much to take in during the typical brief tourist visit. There's great advice about what to try to see with itineraries for a 1-day, 3-day and weeklong visit. A great piece of advice is to get a feel for Venice by staking out a seat in the rear open area of a waterbus. If you buy an inexpensive multi-day pass, this gives you a cheap but comprehensive tour of the city and let's you get off and on repeatedly wherever you like.

Venice hotel rooms are small and expensive. You will pay more for a small walk-in-closet-sized room than for a comfortable room with sitting area in Room or Milan. Despite this, I think it is necessary to stay overnight rather than make daytrips from outlying suburban hotels in order to get the true flavor of the city. Walking through Venice at night makes you feel like a character in Othello; you won't get that if you have to leave at the end of the day. The Knopf guide does include some hotel recommendations but it's very limited. A better bet for choosing a hotel would be the Michelin Red Guide Italy. The Red Guide just gives listings with abbreviations describing the accommodations. The Knopf guide can give you an idea about the neighborhood your hotel is in before making a specific choice from the Michelin Red Guide.

I just got my own Knopf Guide for Venice. No more having to renew at the library. While the Eyewitness guides are great for zeroing in on a desired sight, the Knopf series has much more detail about the place in question. I like to buy and read the Knopf guide about 6 months before I leave for my trip so I have plenty of daydream fodder, and then take the Eyewitness for when I actually get there.

The Knopf will take you to places that the regular tourists don't know about. Once you get there, if you've read the book, you'll know much more about these places than even some of the natives! My favorite things: The historical photos in the front, the drawings and photos of art (I especially enjoy these after I come home and am feeling nostalgic), and the hotel and restaurant listings in the back.

So, Slobodan Milosevic has been toppled.. Guess that means all will now be peaceful in Kosovo!

Well, no, actually..and this book will tell you why.

Written just before NATO's 1999 air campaign over Kosovo, Julie Mertus illuminates the process by which trust between Serbs and Kosovars became impossible. It hints at Phillip Gourevitch's reflection that "power comes when you convince your enemy to inhabit YOUR version of HIS story".

That struggle, each wanting the "correct" version of history to stand, lies at the heart of all Balkan conflicts of the last ten years.

Through innumerable interviews with the ordinary people of Kosovo, Serbian and Albanian, Julie Mertus reveals how competing myths came to be, and how they then contributed to an environment where terrorism and atrocity became - ultimately - a logical choice.

She does not go back to the mythology surrounding the 1389 defeat of the Serbian Prince Lazar at Kosovo Polje - the rallying point for Milosevic. (Covered already in Noel Malcolm's "Kosovo: A Short History). Mertus shows how events within our generation created defining national stories.

Two quick examples.

In 1990, thousands of schoolchildren fell ill. The ethnic Albanian understanding: they were deliberately poisoned, probably with Sarin gas, by Serbian authorities. It was proof of the evil Serbs would be willing to do to Albanians. The UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) recruited youths with the argument that without resistance, they would all be poisoned again.

The Serb response to the same event was that it was mass hysteria at best, or at worst a deliberate plot by ethnic Albanians to generate international sympathy against them, the Serbs. It proved the extent of the Kosovars' untrustworthiness, their deviousness.

There could be no common ground between those views. Which story you believed, defined you.

Similarly, there is the case of Djordje Martinovic, a Serbian peasant who turned up at hospital with a bottle in his rectum and a story about being assaulted in his field by "masked men". Although later apparently recanting his story, and confessing his "assault" had been a botched act of self-gratification, for Serbs it became a rallying point. Dismissing the recantation as an Albanian plot, Serbs were only too happy to believe that this, the violation of an honest peasant in an act with echoes of the old Turkish practice of impaling, was the extent to which ethnic Albanians would not hesitate to stoop. Martinovic quickly returned to his original story. He remains on the list of Serb martyrs to this day.

Today, Kosovo remains in an effective state of partition, nearly all its former Serb population living above the divided city of Mitrovica. Without the presence of KFOR troops, armed conflict would be inevitable. It is not their religion, or even their language, that divides Serb from Kosovar. It is the incompatability of the stories they tell. Since this book was written, both sides have volumes of fresh grievances, accentuating their enemy's inhumanity and highlighting their own victimhood. These stories, nearly all with some grain of truth, are now being woven themselves into the complex fabric of national myth.

Brilliantly, painstakingly and without taking sides, Prof. Mertus has given us a vivid account of how events become remembered. She gives us the template to understand better all the intractable conflicts of our times.

Mertus has found a new way to analyze how the elite can transform a conflict. Her theme of the "Truths" resonates strongly throughout the book. Her unbiased view and in-depth discussion left me wanting more. My interest in the subject of Balkan history grew from reading this title.

Julie Mertus has done a fine job of writing from her on the spot investigations of what she found during her interviews.

I normally race through books like a speed demon, but this was so enjoyable I read it s-l-o-w-l-y - and several times.

Olga was a woman raised in the lap of luxury in the Russian court but was able and willing to work at hard physical labor on farms in Denmark and Canada for decades without apparent bitterness at what many might consider her "fall" from high status.

At the very end of her life with no income and relatives around her, she accepted an invitation from Russian emigrees and spent her last months on a second-floor apartment in a working-class neighborhood in Toronto.

I have been going through some drastic changes in my life - rather unwillingly - and have spent a lot of time thinking about Olga and how she accepted things that happened.

Was she perfect? No, but I wonder if I could have lived her life with so much courage and acceptance.

I HIGHLY recommend this book.

This is a wonderful book, written in direct cooperation with the Grand Duchess herself. Born into the purple as the daughter of a Tsar, Olga Alexandrovna ended her life as she had always sought to live it - simply, and with family. Her insights, and the author's, are a wonderful portal to an era of an almost-mythical past. Though this new edition has many errors, I think it's due to sloppy editing of computer scans. I hope that next time around, these errors will be fixed.

This is one of the finest books I have read from the Romanov treasury. I have a first edition copy that took me almost a year to find and it was worth the wait. Because of Mr. Vorres research and interview skills combined the the story telling of the Grand Duchess, I was unable to put it down. In fact, I am reading it for a second time. There is no better story than that from the one who lives it. Olga was a cut above the others in the Imperial family in that she was devoted to common folk. She is revered and respected for thinking outside the box. A woman ahead of her time and one that refused to abide by the norm. I wish I could have met her in the simplest of circumstances. I recommend this book to those who a truly interested in Romanov history. She does a great justice in defense of her family.

If you're off to Scotland in search of ancestral roots or the remains of them and want to travel the roads less taken, IN SEARCH OF ANCIENT SCOTLAND may prove useful. Gerald and Dorothy Ruzicki have collected material about Scotland from web sites and references guides (listed in an appendix section), and their own travel experiences, and created a somewhat unique guide.

The guide is organized into eight regions in Scotland and every site within each region is rated with 0-3 stars. The focus of the guide is historical places 5000 BC to 1700 AD, so Culloden Moor, for example, is not included in the 'Index of Sites'. Included selections are organized along a time line in an appendix so that if, for example, you only wanted to visit only Medieval places you could do so. Appreciative of the popularity of "Braveheart" the Ruzickis include a good deal of information about Stirling and Bannockburn and other locations associated with William Wallace and Robert the Bruce. Apparently, Stirling has much to recommend it beyond the 'Braveheart' connections, not the least of which is an easy drive from Glasgow or Perth.

What may be of great interest to the traveler with an "antiquarian" bent and plenty of time to drive to more remote areas, are ancient sites such as the 'Standing Stones of Callanish' (Calanais) that rival Stonehenge; 'Dun Trodden' and 'Dun Telve' in the Northwest Highlands; and 'Mousa Broch' that can only be reached by ferry across a temperamental sea. Later period sites closer to the central cities such as Jedburgh Abbey founded in 1138 by David I; Traquair built in 1107 AD and continuously inhabited since; or the ruins of Castle Tioram where Robert the Bruce once lived are also identified.

There are many interesting and useful books on Scotland, but if you're brave enough to travel independently and hankering to find ancient sites not always included in mainstream publications, check out this book. In addition to the "where to go" and "what to see", the Ruzicki's include much practical information about traveling independently, including a chapter on driving in Scotland.

I was so glad to have this useful book during my trip to Scotland! It has excellent descriptions, explanations, history, and stories for ancient monuments, most of which aren't covered in normal guide books. Without this book, I would have missed so many interesting places - never knowing there was a cairn right next to the road or megaliths in the next farmer's field! Plus, there are planning maps and excellent driving instructions, which you'll NEED for some hard-to-find sites!

We just returned from a visit to prehistoric sites in the Highlands of Scotland, Skye and Lewis. Of all the guidebooks we took along, this was by far the most helpful, with very accurate directions for finding the sites (many of which we would never have found without it!) and good descriptions of all the aspects of the sites as well. Don't even try to go there without it!

I became much more engaged with this book when Davy reached the Highlands.Prior to that, I was finding his repetition of B&B conversations a little tedious.In the Highlands and Mull , Davy seemed more enthusiastic about what he was seeing (and it helped that we share an interest and wonderment in prehistoric sites!)
Davy highlighted the issue of negative attitudes towards "incomers" in the Highlands,something which most visitors would be unaware of.Good for you Davy, these things need to be aired .
On the whole , I suspect that Davy's view of the Scots may be rather skewed , given that he only seemed to meet people in B&Bs and late night in pubs, thus missing out on whole sections of this fascinating, charming and intelligent population!
By the way,Davy,in case you're reading this : visit Arbroath next time and try the local delicacy -Arbroath SMOKIES.Delicious smoked haddock.I doubt that anyone in Arbroath has heard of Arbroath stovies , unless they,ve read your book !
Overall, an enjoyable ,quirky and gently humorous book.For Scots, it gives us the chance "To see oursels as ithers see us "

David McFaddden would be an interesting fellow to with whom to travel. Whether making circle tours of the Great Lakes or searching for Pictish earthworks in Scotland, his poet's eye, wonderful listening skills and knack for encountering strange persons and situations makes just reading about his travels an experience. I laughed aloud, I shook my head in confusion and/or disgust, and I looked at a map and did research. What I would really like is to buy him dinner at Harbor Haus on the Lake Superior shore in Copper Harbor to ask why he thinks "Scots Wha' Hae' is a sad song and when he's going to write the Lake Superior book.

I found this gem of a book while visiting McFadden's homeland of Canada. Being someone who has an enormous interest in Scottish heritage, the title caught my interest. I read the first four chapters while standing in the bookstore while other customers looked in my direction for laughing out loud. McFaddens view on the land of the Scots had me smiling through the entire book. And his attitude is genuine (we became email friends). The people he came in contact with were to the average person a bit out of the ordinary. He brought out the wanderlust in me enough to want to experience the same route that both he and H.V. Morton took. His descriptions were so top notch, it brings you right in the very circle of friends he meets. I recommend this book to anyone who loves the quirkiness and fun that should always be a part of our travels.

This is an excellent study of the highest levels of the German Army during WWII. But I think the main lesson is that there was no high command, at least in the sense the British and the Americans had one. Hitler and the generals around him spent their time micromanaging the Eastern Front with occasional interference in African and European battles. Hitler acted as if he were the counterpart of Eisenhower, not Marshall or Brooke. It is as if Rosevelt were to have sent Eisenhower daily detailed instructions on where to attack and what to defend.

The problem was only partially Hitler's. The Germans never really created a staff to manage a global conflict. Hadler resented Hitler's inferference, but because it was usually stupid, not because Hitler should have been managing the war, not the battles. The Germans were superb at what they considered the "operational" level of command--the control of armies on a single battlefield. But they never looked at the "big picture."

The book also proves that the German army high command, such as it was, had serious failings. They simply did not understand the logistics of a campaign as vast as the Eastern Front. Nor did they have the intelligence gathering capacity to estimate what they were getting into when they attacked the Soviet Union. Worse, they did not even realize their problems.

This book can teach a lot about why people frequently fail to understand and act upon hard facts. Learning this can help avoid future disasters of any sort.

This book is an attempt to re-write what has been the conventional view of the relation between Adolph Hilter and the German General Staff. After the war, Hitler was conveniently dead and that allowed the German Generals to put out a version of history that was accepted for some years but was at odds with the truth. The German Generals had towed the line that they were politically neutral prior to the 1930?s and that they had not been supporters of Nazi aims. Further that they opposed some aspects of Nazi war aims and acted in a professional way. Lastly they were highly competent and might have won the war if it had not had been for Hitler continually interfering with their operational plans.

Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines.

One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes.

Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal.

Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that they shared with Hitler and in fact it is clear that they had little insight into the reason for their defeat even after the finish of the war.

Another issue dealt with by the book is the question of the role of Hitler?s leadership in bringing about the loss of the war for Germany. Megargee clearly shows that it was only in the later part of the war (1944) that tensions arose between Hitler and the Generals. By this time the war was lost. Over the big decisions there was not a lot of disagreement.

This book although expensive is short and easy to read. It is interesting not just for those interested in the war, but it illustrates how history can be distorted by over reliance on self serving material.

Conventional wisdom regarding the fate of the Wehrmacht in World War Two has always been that it was Adolph Hitler's maniacal meddling in the day to day affairs of the armed forces that created the catastrophic defeats along the eastern front that lost the war. Indeed, many of the first hand post-war memoirs of those German generals and other staff officials supported this point of view, giving one the idea that if only the generals had had their way, Germany would have been victorious. There is much to commend such a view; certainly Hitler's decisions were often counter-intuitive and counter-productive, and he often seemed to change his mind and the tactics associated with a campaign in mid-stream. The results of these actions were indeed often disastrous. Yet, as the author of this scholarly investigation into the machinations of the General Staff and its decision making process brilliantly argues in this fascinating and informative book, the evidence supporting such a theory that Hitler single-handedly lost the war through his incompetence simply does not exist.

In fact, this book is quite well written; it is authoritative, informative, and extremely well documented. The author has managed to turn what could have been a historical curiosity for the amusement of other academic historians into a terrific reading experience for a more general audience. He approaches the subject with verve and a plethora of telling examples of how the general staff were involved and complicit in the day to day decisions that were so disastrous for the Wehrmacht; far from being helpless factotums who merely carried out Hitler's demands, they initiated debates and discussions in which Hitler often played the provocateur, attempting to gain a better idea of what each of the participants in the discussions really thought regarding a particular course of action. Also, in employing the kinds of primary evidence used here, he illustrates how involved and enthusiastic many of the generals were in making fateful decisions. As the author maintains, there is no credible evidence that they did in fact take any serious issue with Operation Barbarossa or with its conduct until things began to go awry.

The simple truth of the matter seems to be that they shared Hitler's myopic faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, and seriously underestimated the capabilities, endurance, and determination of the Soviet forces. The fateful decision was the first one, the effort to invade the Soviet Union without recognizing the serious logistical and tactical problems that were ensue when prosecuting a fight over such a vast distance and with a front that was thousands of miles long. Likewise, the decision by Hitler and General Staff to declare war against the Americans seemed more the result of an arrogant disregard for facts in favor of self-serving ideology. Of course, to argue that the general staff itself was complicit is not to deny the degree of sloth and banality associated with Hitler's command and control of the armed forces. He brashly demoted men who had failed him and his wildly unrealistic expectations while promoting incompetent sycophants based solely on their loyalty. Such policies compounded the difficulties associated with attempting to execute a war that had turned into a much wider and more complex effort than Hitler or the General Staff had ever envisioned.

This is a wonderful book, one that gives fresh evidence of the dangers inherent in consensus management. Hitler's fateful problem was that by demanding the outrageous and the unrealistic, he increasingly gathered around him the worst liars, game-players, and toadies in the history of modern warfare. He consistently winnowed out anyone who told him the unvarnished truth, especially if it was negative. By doing so he guaranteed the desperate failure of his most audacious and precarious adventures into the realm of war, and brought the heavy weight of ruin and destruction upon himself, the General Staff, the Wehrmacht, and the German people. Of course, along the way, he managed to ruin most of Europe and kill tens of millions of people, as well. This is an excellent book, and is one I heartily recommend. Enjoy!

Few of us will ever forget the events of September 11, where we were, how the nation reacted. Tony Rennell tells us of another earthshattering event, for its time, the death of Queen Victoria.

Beginning a few days before the Queen's death, Rennell proceeds slowly through her final illness, providing enough background to satisfy us without boring us. After the Queen passes, he gives us ample reaction to the death, even printing (rather pompous by today's standards) poems and songs written at the time (interesting to compare them with the songs written after September 11). He brings us through the funeral and burial at Windsor.

Rennell tells us what was not widely known before--that Victoria was buried holding a picture of John Brown and a locket with his hair, and wearing a ring he had given her. He is careful to put this in the proper context, devoting an appendix to setting forth his view that Brown and the Queen had an entirely proper, though unconventional, relationship.

Rennell puts the event in historical perspective--the conflict between those who wanted a "proper" amount of mourning, and those who wanted to move on quickly, reopen the theaters, put off mourning dress. I wonder how long it has been since the general public wore mourning for a monarch, and if there will be any expectation that it be done next time. Yet in 1901, the period of public mourning was shortened to "only" six weeks!

This book was published before 9/11, but I wonder, if, in 2101, a similar book will be published to remind the public of our watershed event.

Well worth reading.

I was going to say "enjoyable and informative", but then thought that saying reading about someone dying was enjoyable wasn't quite right. However, the author has given us so much background and detail on what was going on in England at this time that I will say those parts were enjoyable!

It seems unbelievable that the government apparently had not done much advance planning. It's as if no one thought the Queen was going to die. I was reminded of the smooth operation of the Queen Mother's funeral in April where everything went like clockwork. Queen Victoria had given a few orders for her funeral, but the details were left to others with the usual squabbling.

I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the British Royal family.

This book covers, and covers quite well, the events surrounding the death of Queen Victoria in 1901. It's especially relevant now that the "Queen Mum" has passed away, for she was more than likely alive when Victoria died, the last connection in the British royal family to that era of pomp and circumstance. It's very interesting to see how death and services for royals were handled 100 years ago, when there were many more monarchies and the almost reverential attitude towards them had not been soured by WWI.
Victoria was beloved by her people, and almost all of them could not remember another reigning monarch, since she ruled for 64 years, almost a lifetime in those days. There was genuine grief and fear at her departure, and a worry at the changing world everyone would face in her absence. A few years ago I read the book "Farewell In Splendor", which covers the same sets of facts, and both of these works are well worth reading. You will learn many things you didn't know about the end of the Victorian age, and perhaps have an air of nostalgia for what appears to be a quite different, and perhaps better, past.